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Kyllo v. United States: Something Old, Nothing New;
Mostly Borrowed, What To Do?
"Recent inventions and business methods call attention to the
next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and
for securing to the individual what Judge Cooley calls the right 'to be
let alone."' Sounds like the lament of a twenty-first century citizen,
concerned over the many modern technological marvels used, for
better or worse, by Big Brother2 to cast a watchful eye. The
contemporary tone of this sentiment, however, belies its origins in a
Harvard Law Review article written in 1890 by Samuel D. Warren
and the future Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis. The
Industrial Revolution and the technological advances of the late
nineteenth century were changing society in generally positive ways,
but with a dark side that threatened the tranquility of life.
Now, more than one hundred years later, advances in electronics
and miniaturization are once again changing our daily lives. The
current information revolution rivals the Industrial Revolution's
impact on society. Once more, change threatens the tranquility of
life. However today, the threats are more insidious, with magical
marvels of technology making walls transparent,3 penetrating
clothing to expose the nude body,4 and turning darkness into
daylight.5 One of these new abilities used to enhance human sensory
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1. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1890).
2. George Orwell, 1984 (1949). "Big Brother" was used by Orwell to refer
to the government in his prescient novel about the threat of potential totalitarianism.
3. See Millivision, L.L.C., Surveillance and Monitoring,
http://millivision.com:8071/survmon.html (last visited Oct. 30,2001). Millivision,
L.L.C. is a major developer of advanced surveillance equipment, including a
millimeter-wave radar system that is capable of creating three dimensional
renderings of objects hidden behind a brick wall. This device emits low energy
microwave radiation that penetrates the wall and is partly reflected back by surfaces
that it encounters. The reflected energy is interpreted by a computer and converted
to an image.
4. See Millivision, L.L.C., Gateway Scanner, http://millivision.com:8071/
gscanner.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2001). Millivision also makes a line of
contraband detection equipment that is passive in that it does not emit any radiation,
only sensing naturally occurring radiation from various objects. This technology
is capable of rendering a fairly detailed image of the bare body underneath clothing.
These devices are not generally available to the public.
5. Two types of technology are generally used for the purposes of "seeing in
the dark," the older and inferior technology is light amplification, still the military
workhorse, issued to infantry forces as the AN/PVS-7D Night Vision Goggles
(NVG's). See IT Industries, http://www.ittnv.com/military/gnvg/anpvs7bg3.pdf
(last visited Oct. 30,2001). The more advanced technology used for night aviation
in special forces helicopters is the Forward Looking Infrared system (FLIR) that
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capacity was tested by the Supreme Court in Kyllo v. United States6
and found to be a search because law enforcement officers were
deemed to "look" inside a home to find drug cultivation activity.
In Kyllo, law enforcement officers used a thermal imaging device,
without a warrant, to view the amount of heat radiating from the
surface of a house. The equipment made the pattern of heat radiation
from the roof visible in the form of a video picture showing a hot
spot. Officers inferred that grow lights were being used for
cultivation of marijuana from that information. The thermal pictures
and electrical utility statements showing above normal power
consumption at that house provided probable cause for issuance of a
search warrant. When the warrant was executed, officers performed
a physical search of the premises and found a marijuana cultivation
operation.7
The Supreme Court's decision in Kyllo is fully consistent with
existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding searches using
enhanced surveillance techniques, relying on an established line of
Fourth Amendment cases. Essentially every element of the decision
appears in one of the cases that traces its roots back to Katz v. United
States,8 a turning point in Fourth Amendment electronic search law.
Kyllo clarified that a home enjoys an increased level of protection
from government intrusion and that governmental use of tools that
disclose information about the inside of a home is considered to be
a search under the Fourth Amendment.9 However, the Court's
reference to the fact that the device used was not in "general public
use," a distinction drawn from dicta in California v. Ciraolo ° and
Dow Chemical Company v. United States," raises some interesting
questions about the surveillance tools themselves, and how they are
critical to the determination of whether a search has occurred. The
ten years between Danny Kyllo's arrest and the Court's decision have
seen the thermal imaging technology become more widely available
and possibly fitting within the meaning of the "general public use" 2
referenced in Kyllo 's holding. Thus, the Kyllo decision leaves an
yields a much clearer image, but still substantially more expensive and bulky. See
Raytheon NightSight PalmIR 250, http://www.raytheoninfrared.com/html/prod2d/
summary.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2001).
6. 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
7. Id. at 30, 121 S. Ct. at 2041.
8. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
9. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 39, 121 S. Ct. at 2046.
10. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
11. 476 U.S. 227, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
12. The phrase "general public use" appears in Kyllo's holding, derived from
dicta in Dow and Ciraolo. The term is not defined, but we must infer that at the
time of Mr. Kyllo's arrest, the thermal imaging device was not in "general public
use."
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impression that when a thermal scanner is in"general public use," its
use by law enforcement to observe a house might not constitute a
search. 3
Is there a message in that aspect of the holding that should prompt
us to ask whether the Constitution provides adequate protections to
the public, or should legislative measures be taken to ensure that the
Fourth Amendment protections of individual privacy are not
continually eroded by technological advances? Will the Constitution
allow the Legislature to restrict one individual liberty (First
Amendment speech) in order to protect another (privacy)?"
Part I of this case note presents the history of Kyllo. The line of
enhanced "looking" jurisprudence is traced in Part II along with the
Court's parallel development of eavesdropping and wiretap law. Part
III examines the Kyllo decision to determine whether it advanced the
protections of the Fourth Amendment with respect to modem
surveillahce techniques and what the privacy implications of the
decision are. In Part IV the federal wiretap statutes are analyzed to
see if they might be construed to include enhanced "looking"'" and
addresses the need to extend these statutes expressly to include
restrictions on enhanced looking as well as listening techniques.
Finally, Part V briefly notes a recent Supreme Court decision that
may be an impediment to statutory protection.
I. KYLLO
In 1991, an agent of the U.S. Department of the Interior became
suspicious that Danny Lee Kyllo was growing marijuana in his home.
Knowing that indoor cultivation of marijuana required high intensity
grow lights that produce significant amounts of heat, the officer used
a thermal imaging device to observe Kyllo's home, one unit of a
triplex in Florence, Oregon. The scans confirmed that the attic area
of Kyllo's unit was emitting much more heat than similar adjacent
units and the agent inferred that grow lights were probably in use in
13. Since 1991, When the events occurred that led to Danny Kyllo's arrest,
thermal imaging devices are being used by the public, raising the issue of whether
this somewhat limited use would rise to the level of "general public use" intended
by the Court in Kyllo. This issue and examples of current public use will be
discussed in this note.
14. The clash between First Amendment Freedom of the Press and
governmental protection of individual privacy was addressed in Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001), and will be discussed briefly in this
casenote.
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
16. The device, an Agema Thermavision 210, is like a video camera, except
that it records images of the infrared radiation patterns emitted by objects rather
than visible light. See infra note 114.
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the attic. Based on tips from informants, Kyllo's larger than normal
electric bill, and the thermal imaging results, the agent obtained asearch warrant and confirmed that Kyllo was growing marijuana in
his attic.
At trial, Kyllo moved to suppress the evidence seized from his
home as being obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
motion was denied. He then entered a conditional guilty plea and
appealed the court's decision to allow the thermal imaging evidence.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing. The district court found that since
the thermal imager "is a non-intrusive device," "did not show any
people or activity within the wall of the structure," and "no intimate
details of the home were observed," its use did not constitute a
search. 7 The district court upheld the validity of the warrant and
reaffirmed its denial of the motion to suppress the thermal imager
evidence. The court of appeals then held that Kyllo showed no
expectation of privacy because he made no effort to conceal the heat
radiating from his house.18 Even if Mr. Kyllo had taken measures to
conceal the heat emissions, the court continued, he could have no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the thermal
imaging device "did not expose any intimate details ofKyllo's life." 9
On application by Kyllo, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review the question of whether the use of a thermal imaging device
to examine a home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is uniquely American
in its statement of a right based on the experience of the colonists.2"
While it does have an English heritage regarding a man's home as
being his castle,2' the real impetus came from the colonists' disdain
for writs of assistance that empowered agents of the King to. enter
anyone's home in search of contraband at any time. Acting on those
17. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30-31,121 S. Ct. 2038,2041 (2001).
18. Kyllo v. United States, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999).
19. Id. at 1047.
20. The United States Government Printing Office, FourthAmendment-Search and Seizure (1996), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/
congress/senate/constitution/amdt4.html.
21. The widely quoted and cited phrase "a man's home is his castle" has its
origins in Lord Coke's reporting of Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91, 77 Eng. Rep.
194 (K.B. 1604).
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concerns, the framers worded the Fourth Amendment2 2 to require a
warrant that specifically identified the place to be searched, the items
to be seized, and justification by a showing of probable cause that the
objects of the search would be located in the place to be searched.23
The Fourth Amendment is only applicable when the government
executes a search.24 A warrant based upon a showing of probable
cause to believe that particular things will be found is generally
required for the search to be valid.25 When the Bill of Rights was
adopted, a search required physical entry into the place to be
searched, a physical reality until the advent of technologies that made
it possible to virtually breach the walls of a structure such as a home.
The Supreme Court first considered this new phenomenon in
Olmstead v. United States,26 a wiretap case.
B. Setting the Stage: Olmstead v. United States
Olmstead was a 1928 case concerned with the tapping of
telephone wires exiting a private residence occupied by bootleggers.
The Court found that the tapping of the telephone wires in no way
intruded into the sanctity of the home, and that the wires themselves
could not be considered an extension of the home.2" The Court also
refused to draw an analogy to the protection afforded to mail because
mail plainly qualified as papers under the Fourth Amendment, and
the more abstract electric impulses that carried the conversation were
certainly not papers.29 However, it was noted that "Congress may, of
course, protect the secrecy of telephone messages by making them,
when intercepted, inadmissible in evidence in federal criminal trials,
by direct legislation."3 °
22. U.S. Const. amend. IV states in part: "[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
23. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625, 6 S. Ct. 524, 529 (1886)
(discussing the history and original meaning of the text of the Fourth Amendment).
24. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475,41 S. Ct. 574, 576 (1921)
where the Court made clear that the Fourth Amendment is "a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and [is] not intended to be a limitation upon other
than governmental agencies."
25. Searches may also be executed under exigent circumstances without a
warrant, but those situations are not within the scope of this note.
26. 277 U.S. 438,48 S. Ct. 564 (1928).
27. Bootlegger is a term used to describe the practice of selling illegal liquor,
especially during the prohibition era. The word is derived from the practice of
concealing the contraband in the upper portion of high top boots.
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 465, 48 S. Ct. at 568.
29. Id. at 465-66, 48 S. Ct. at 568.
30. Id., 48 S. Ct. at 568.
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Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmsteadrecognized that government
eavesdropping on telephone communications was a Fourth
Amendment concern. While the majority found that no search had
occurred since no physical intrusion had taken place, Justice Brandeis
realized that technology was fundamentally changing an individual's
ability to seek solitude and "[t]he progress of science in furnishing
the government with means of espionage [was] not likely to stop with
wire tapping."3' He also noted that "[tjhere is no difference between
the sealed letter and the private telephone message" and would have
afforded the same degree of protection to both. a2 Thus was the
concept of privacy first interjected into Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence.
Acting on the Court's suggestion, Congress then enacted
legislation protecting the privacy of telephone conversations in
Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934.33 The statute
stated, in part, "no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person., 34 The Court applied the statute in
Nardone v. United States a5 holding that the government was a
"person". in the meaning of the statute, and that the statute required
the exclusion of evidence acquired by wiretap without a warrant even
though Olmstead would have permitted its use.
C. Katz Overrules Olmstead
Statutory protections kept the eavesdropping issue out of the
courts for a while, but once again, technological advances surpassed
the limits of statutory protection in 1967. In Katz v. United States,36
the Supreme Court decided that law enforcement use of a microphone
mounted on the outside of a public phone booth to capture one end
of a telephone conversation was a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Charles Katz had entered a public phone booth to place
several illegal bets. FBI agents recorded his conversation without a
warrant and he was prosecuted. A majority of the Court found that
even though there was no intrusion into the interior of the phone
booth, Katz was justified in expecting that no one was listening to his
conversation because he took reasonable steps to prevent anyone
31. Id.at474,48S.Ct.at571.
32. Id. at 475, 48 S. Ct. at 571.
33. Now embodied in 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1991).34. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 380-81, 58 S. Ct. 275,276 (1937)(reciting the text of 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934)).
35. Id. at 381-84, 58 S. Ct. at 276-78.
36. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967).
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from doing so. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion has become
widely cited as the defacto two-pronged Katz test, i.e., in order to
receive protection under the Fourth Amendment a person must
exhibit a subjective expectation ofprivacy, and that expectation must
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
7
As before, Congress passed legislation regulating both private
and governmental eavesdropping, enacting Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.38 Thus, further
development of electronic eavesdropping jurisprudence was
somewhat limited by the statutory protections that exceeded those
afforded by the Fourth Amendment.'
While the legislation inhibited full development of Katz with
regard to technologically enhanced listening, Katz evolved through
its application to other forms of search and surveillance. As the
Court pointed out in Katz, the Fourth Amendment protects people,
.not places, and no trespass is necessary for a search to violate its
provisions.' Justice Harlan's two-pronged Katz test established that
the protections of the Fourth Amendment are not spatially dependant,
but are more properly related to a person's reasonable expectation of
privacy as manifested in his behavior. Conceptually, the right is
personal and it must relate to an interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment."
D. Post-Katz Search Jurisprudence
Oliver v. United States confirmed that a person must not only
have a subjective expectation of privacy, but that society must be
prepared to recognize the reasonableness of that expectation.42 In
Oliver, law enforcement officers entered private property that was
marked with no trespassing signs and was enclosed by fences and
gates. The officers found a cultivated field of marijuana over a mile
from the defendant's home. 43 The Court found that the marijuana
37. Id. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at 516.
38. Codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
39. The statutes were also amended significantly in subsequent years to expand
protections as technologies emerged that created new risks. Cellular telephones and
cordless phones are two examples of those new devices that required new
protections from eavesdropping.
40. Katz,389U.S.at351,88S.Ct.at 5l.
41. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), the Court
addressed the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to defendants who failed to
claim any interest in the place searched or the items seized. The nature of the place
searched and the degree of control over the place asserted by the party claiming
Constitutional protection are factors to be considered.
42. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,177, 104 S. Ct. 1735,1741 (1984).
43. Id. at 173, 104 S. Ct. at 1738.
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patch was in an open field as it was understood at common law and
not entitled to the same degree of protection as a house and its
curtilage." The existence of fences and trespass signs might provide
a subjective sense of privacy, but not one that "society recognizes as
reasonable. '45 Oliver had the effect of tying the Katz test back totraditional notions that certain circumstances never justify an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, such as open fields.By contrast, certain places such as a home and its curtilage, enjoy a
much elevated expectation of privacy at common law and under the
text of the Fourth Amendment."
The protections of the wiretap statutes were tested in 1979 when,in Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a "pen register" 7 could be used, without a warrant, to recordphone numbers dialed from a residential telephone. Applying theKatz test, the majority found there was no reasonable expectation ofprivacy because all phone customers know that the phone company
uses this information for billing and rate information and that a list
of toll calls appears on the monthly statement. Justice Stewart argued
against the majority's opinion that the phone number was not like a
conversation. He wrote that a list of numbers "could reveal theidentities of the persons and the places called, and thus reveal the
most intimate details of a person's life." '4 Thus, in his view, it was not
a question of the quality of information that was obtained, but that
any information in which a telephone user had "a legitimate
expectation of privacy" was indeed obtained.49
The Court addressed a unique electronic search question in
United States v. Karo.50 There, an electronic transmitter was attached
to the inside of a container of chemicals used in the manufacture ofillegal drugs. The transmitter was capable of emitting only a tone or
"beep," but no other information. This beep made it possible for
someone a short distance away to trace the location of the container,but it could not give precise location information. When the suspectsin Karo picked up the containers, DEA agents in unmarked cars used
the beepers to follow the suspects' vehicle to a residence and later
44. Curtilage is the immediate area surrounding a dwelling place, usually
enclosed. See Black's Law Dictionary 389 (7th ed. 1999).45. Id. at 179, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)).
46. Id. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.47. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,736 n. 1, 99 S. Ct. 2577,2578 n. 1 (1979)("A pen register is a mechanical device that records the numbers dialed on atelephone by monitoring the electrical impulses caused when the dial on the
telephone is released. It does not record any part of the conversation.").
48. Id. at 748, 99 S. Ct. at 2584 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 747-48, 99 S. Ct. at 2583-84.
50. 468 U.S. 705, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
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followed the containers when they were relocated to other
intermediate storage locations.5 The Court ruled that when an
electronic device "reveal[s] a critical fact about the interior of [a]
premises that the Government is extremely interested in knowing and
that it could not have otherwise obtained without a warrant,"52 a
warrantless search had occurred. The Court noted that the use of a
beeper for following a vehicle to the cabin that was later searched
with a warrant was permitted by the Fourth Amendment, as was held
in a similar prior case.5" The problem arose when the signal from the
beeper was relied upon to ensure that the container remained in the
cabin for a prolonged period of time. That information could not
have been acquired with certainty by visual surveillance, a method
permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
In 1986, the Court decided two aerial surveillance cases that
would provide important insights into the application of the objective
prong of the Katz test. The first, California v. Ciraolo,54 was a
marijuana cultivation case where the police received an anonymous
tip that the activity was taking place in a residential yard adjacent to
a home.55 A police officer secured a private airplane and flew over
the residence at an altitude of 1000 feet, within legally navigable
airspace. With unassisted eyesight, the officer was able to identify
and photograph a number of marijuana plants growing in the yard.
Unlike Oliver, Ciraolo involved the curtilage of a home, a place
where a greater expectation of privacy is considered reasonable.
56
Applying the two part Katz test, the Court noted that the respondent
had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy with multiple tall
fences enclosing the yard, although that question was not before the
Court on appeal. The question on appeal was whether Ciraolo's
expectation of privacy was reasonable. The Court observed that
"[t]he Fourth Amendment... has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares... [n]or does the mere fact that an individual
has taken measures to restrict some views of his activities preclude
an officer's observations from a public vantage point where he has a
right to be and which renders the activities clearly visible.""
The Court continued, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
51. Id. at 708-11, 104 S. Ct. at 3300-01.
52. Id. at 715, 104 S. Ct. at 3303.
53. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 103 S. Ct. 1081.(1983).
54. 476 U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
55. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1809.
56. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742.
57. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
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Amendment protection.""8 The Court concluded that any expectation
of the respondent that his garden was protected from aerial
observation was unreasonable and not an expectation that society
would honor since private and commercial aviation overflight by the
general public had become common.59
Justice Powell, writing the dissenting opinion in Ciraolo,
cautioned the majority that they were overlooking Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion in Katz where he stated that any construction of
the Fourth Amendment that limited protection to instances of
physical intrusion "is, in the present day, bad physics as well as bad
law, for reasonable expectations of privacy may be defeated by
electronic as well as physical invasion."'  The Ciraolo majority
distinguished Justice Harlan's remarks as inapplicable to aerial
photography because he was referring to "future electronic
developments and the potential for electronic interference with...
private communications," and the remarks were "not aimed at simple
visual observations from a public place."' The majority pointed out
that after Katz, any form of electronic surveillance "aimed at
intercepting private conversations" required the issuance ofa warrant
upon showing of probable cause.62 The majority did not explicitly
mention that this protection was not the result of the Katzjurisprudence per se, but rather the legislative response to Katz in
enacting Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968.
The other aerial surveillance case, Dow Chemical Company v.
United States, 3 was decided the same day as Ciraolo. In Dow, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used a commercial
aerial mapping service to photograph a 2000 acre chemical plant
from high altitudes. The aircraft made passes at 12,000, 3,000, and
1,200 feet, all within legally navigable airspace. Dow Chemical
Company had taken extensive security measures to shield the facility
from observation, primarily to thwart efforts by competitors to steal
trade secrets."
Dow Chemical Company claimed that the surveillance of their
facility by the EPA was a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
asserting that the plant was a form of "industrial curtilage" subject to
58. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1813 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.
Ct. 507 (1967)).
59. Id. at 214, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
60. Id. at 216, 106 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Katz).61. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
62. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1813 (emphasis added).
63. 476 U.S. 227, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
64. Id. at 229, 106 S. Ct. at 1822.
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an elevated level of protection,65 that trade secret laws protected the
complex from aerial observation," and that the taking of pictures
using sophisticated mapping cameras was a search requiring a
warrant under the Fourth Amendment. 67 The claim of protection
under the trade secrets laws was quickly dismissed because the EPA
had no intention to compete with Dow. The claim that the industrial
complex should be considered as an "industrial curtilage" received
some attention, but was found to fit more closely to the common law
concept of an open field. The Court's analysis focused on the
defendant's contention that the EPA's action amounted to a search.
The Court identified the critical question to be whether the high-
resolution aerial photographs revealed any intimate detail.6" The
government conceded that the use of "highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public, such as
satellite technology, might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant," but that the photographs in question were "not so revealing
of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." '69 The Court
accepted this reasoning and noted that just because a greater degree
of detail than the naked eye could reveal was present, that was not
enough to make the EPA's photography a search. 0 However, the
Court went on to say that "[a]n electronic device to penetrate walls
or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of
chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise very different
and far more serious questions.",7' The Court concluded that the plant
complex was not a curtilage and that the EPA's high resolution aerial
photography from navigable airspace was not a search.72
The Dow dissent countered that while the majority cited Katz, it
completely ignored the Katz standard and its shifting of the question
away from physical trespass. The dissent pointed out that if the
analysis of the majority were to replace the Katz rule, privacy rights
would be at risk of erosion as technological advances became
"generally available in society.
73
E. Contemporary Thermal Imaging Cases
Prior to the Kyllo decision, there were a number of cases heard in
the federal circuit courts involving the use of thermal imaging
65. Id. at 233, 106 S. Ct. at 1824.
66. Id. at 232, 106 S. Ct. at 1823.
67. Id. at 234, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
68. Dow, 476 U.S. at 234, 106 S. Ct. at 1825.
69. Id. at 238, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 (emphasis added).
70. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
71. Id. at 239, 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
72. Id., 106 S. Ct. at 1827.
73. Id. at 251, 106 S. Ct. at 1834 (emphasis added).
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devices by law enforcement. These cases are a rag bag of fact
patterns, many not close enough to Kyllo to be directly analogous, but
with important analytical elements similar to those used by the Court
in Kyllo. In United States v. Ishmael,74 the facts were very similar to
Kyllo, except the structure in question was not a house, but an
outbuilding with a very sophisticated marijuana cultivation operation
in the basement. The Fifth Circuit held that a thermal imaging device
"when used in an 'open field' does not offend the Fourth Amendment
because it is passive and non-intrusive" and "[t]he sanctity of one's
home or business is undisturbed."" Other cases, however, involved
homes being the subject of thermal imaging surveillance. Those
cases generally fell into two analytically similar groups, one in which
the courts focused on the question of whether a subjective
expectation of privacy existed with respect to thermal emissions (the
waste heat cases),76 the other group focusing on the objective
expectation ofprivacy in that phenomenon (the intimate detail cases).
Some of the cases combined the two analytical paths and found
neither element of the Katz test was met.
The courts in the "waste heat" cases have reasoned that the first
prong of the Katz test must fail where someone knowingly exposes
the heat generated in the marijuana cultivation process because there
is no subjective expectation of privacy. Courts drew an analogy
between the knowing venting of heat and the discarding of garbage
bags containing incriminating evidence as was the case in California
v. Greenwood." In Greenwood, police found incriminating evidence
in garbage bags set by the curb for collection and the Court relied on
Katz in holding that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. 78 The argument drawn from Greenwood by
the courts in these "waste heat" cases is that even when some
measures are taken to mask or disguise the heat, it is subjectively
unreasonable to believe that it will not be detected. 79
74. 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995).
75. Id. at 857.
76. The term "waste heat" was used by courts in those cases to characterize
thermal emissions as a by-product of normal existence, analogous to garbage set out
for collection.
77. 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
78. Id. at 41, 108 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
88 S. Ct. 507 (1967)).
79. See generally United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220 (D. Haw. 1991); United States v. Ford,
34 F.3d 992 (1 Ith Cir. 1994); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Robinson,
62 F.3d 1325 (11 th Cir. 1995).
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The other line of thermal imaging cases fall in the "intimate
detail" category, where the objective prong of the Katz test failed.
The courts in those cases found that even where someone takes
adequate measures to demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy, that expectation is not reasonable because the thermal
imaging device does not disclose intimate details of any activity
inside the house. 0 The reasoning was that since the information
discemable by the thermal imager was not particularly revealing of
"intimate" activity, it was not something that society is willing to
recognize as a privacy issue. All of these cases rely heavily on
Ciraolo and Dow where the amount of detail revealed was the key
issue."'
Oddly, one theory that always appears in the background of these
cases is that because thermal imaging does not physically intrude into
a protected space, its use does not constitute a search in the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment. This return to the traditional trespass
theory of privacy ignores that Katz expressly overruled Olmstead.
Whether or not an intrusion in the form of a microphone, an officer,
sound waves, or other forms of radiation occurs is not germane to the
search issue after Katz where the Court held that "[t]he fact that the
electronic device employed.., did not happen to penetrate the wall
of the booth could have no constitutional significance." 2
Among the federal appeals cases examining the thermal imaging
issue, one stands out in applying the Katz test in a manner faithful to
the original reasoning the Katz Court followed in developing that test.
In United States v. Cusumano,8 3 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
looked beyond the means used to gather information and asked
instead whether the actions of the person being monitored manifested
an intent to maintain privacy. Cusumano involved facts very similar
to Kyllo, with the petitioner growing marijuana in a home, and law
enforcement officers using an infrared imager to detect the heat of
grow lights therein. The Cusumano court, in examining *the second
element of Katz (an objective expectation of privacy), realized that
earlier courts had focused their analysis on the deficiencies of the
thermal imaging device and how it did not reveal great detail about
the activities inside a house. In using that approach, prior decisions
completely overlooked the fact. that such technologies have a
80. See generally United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (1 Ith Cir. 1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d
668 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992 (11th Cir. 1994).
81. Recall that the court in Ciraolo and Dow discussed above, found the lack
of intimate detail to be an important factor in determining that the objective prong
of the Katz test had failed.
82. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967)
83. 67 F.3d 1497, 1502 (1995).
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tendency to improve. A narrow holding that a particular device did
not show enough detail to offend the Fourth Amendment would
inevitably lead to ongoing judicial review of each new and improved
version of the device."
Concluding that thermal imaging is permissible under the Fourth
Amendment based on the limited capabilities of existing devices
would "allow the privacy of the home to hinge upon the outcome of
a technological race of measure/counter-measure between the
average citizen and the government-a race, we expect, that the
people will surely lose."" A particularly astute observation of the
court was made in a footnote, commenting on the alleged inability of
the thermal imaging device to discern any intimate detail of the
activities of the home. The Tenth Circuit commented that "[i]t is
somewhat disingenuous for the government to plead so forcefully the
deficiencies of its machine while simultaneously averring that the
output of that device is sufficiently reliable to support the warrant
that issued.86 It seems questionable that a valid warrant could be
issued if the evidence offered to show probable cause does not reveal
anything of significance.
III. THE KYLLO DECISION
A. The Majority's Analysis
The Fourth Amendment guarantees people a right to be secure in
their homes, free from unreasonable governmental intrusions.8"
However, the Fourth Amendment only applies when an agent of the
government actually conducts a search.8 8 NMere visual observation is
not a search.89 Whether the conduct of government agents
constituted a search was the question decided in Kyllo, just as it was
in Katz." As the Kyllo Court pointed out, "[t]he Fourth Amendment
protection of the home has never been extended to require law
enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on
public thoroughfares."'" The Court had previously applied the Katz
test to determine if a search had occurred, even with respect to a
84. Id. at 1504.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1505 n.12.
87. U.S. Const. amend. IV provides that "the right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated."
88. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S. Ct. 574, 576 (1921).
89. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2042 (2001).
90. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967).
91. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32, 121 S. Ct. at 2042 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986)).
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house, by inquiring whether a person "manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search" and
whether "society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable."92
The Kyllo Court acknowledged that the Katz test is problematic
and somewhat circular.93 But with respect to a house, a place
expressly recognized in the text of the Fourth Amendment, a
minimum expectation of privacy exists and is acknowledged to be
reasonable, and that "obtaining by sense enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion constitutes
a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not
in general public use."94 The Court applied the Katz test in a very
particular way, stating that by confining an activity to the home, an
individual is expressing a subjective expectation of privacy, and that
the protection of a house in the text of the Fourth Amendment makes
that expectation reasonable as long as there is no other way the
information could have been obtained.95 Thus, the Katz test was
applied in Kyllo, but was narrowed to the circumstance where a house
is the object of an alleged search. The objective component of the
test with respect to houses is reduced to the question of whether the
tool used to enhance sensory perception is "in general public use."96
By implication, it would seem that when one's neighbors can buy a
piece of equipment that can reveal information about the inside of a
house, it is no longer objectively reasonable to expect that they will
not buy it and use it.
The Court found the quality and quantity of information obtained
by the sensory enhancement to be irrelevant to the question of
whether a search occurred. The fact that any information about the
interior of a house "that could not otherwise have been obtained
without physical intrusion" is collected makes the surveillance a
search.97 This is similar to the Ciraolo Court's observation in dicta
that "aerial observation of curtilage may become invasive ... [if]
modem technology . . . discloses to the senses those intimate
associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to police
92. Id. at 33, 121 S. Ct. at 2042-43 (quoting Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 211, 106 S.
Ct. at 1811).
93. Perhaps the best example is the comment in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979), where the Court noted that the subjective expectation
prong could be defeated by the government broadcasting notices on television for
a number of days that all houses would be searched without warrants. It would be
difficult then to claim that people had a subjective expectation of privacy.
94. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34, 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
95. Id., 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
96. Id., 121 S. Ct. at 2043.
97. Id., 121 S. Ct. at 2403.
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or fellow citizens." ' The Court in Kyllo interpreted that passage to
mean that the invasion resulted from observation of things "otherwise
imperceptible" and that "intimate associations" werejust an example
of the kind of thing that might thus be observed." Inquiry into
whether a particular technology provides intimate detail is not the
appropriate question. In the home, "all details are intimate details
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."'
The holding in Kyllo is an adaptation of Katz to situations
involving houses, with text from Ciraolo, Karo, and Dow Chemical
interwoven. Kyllo held that 'where... the government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a search."' ' The phrase "device that is not in
generalpublic use" has origins in Ciraolo, where the Court said that
"[iln an age where private and commercial flight in the public
airways is routine, it is unreasonable... to expect... constitutional[]
protect[ion] from being observed . . . from an altitude of 1,000
feet" 2 and hence, that the second Katz element was not met.
Similar language also appeared in Dow Chemical where the
government conceded that "using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment not generally available to the public . . . might be
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant."'' 3  However, the
government asserted that the mapping cameras used to photograph
the Dow plant were nothing out of the ordinary and available to
anyone who could afford to hire an aerial mapping contractor.
The language "explore details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion" is derived from
Karo where the Court found that "a beeper.., does reveal a critical
fact about the interior of the premises that the Government is
extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise
obtained without a warrant."'" Thus, Kyllo did not reveal anything
new, but rather clarified the application of Katz to a house, followed
Karo with respect to the quantity and quality of information that a
device must reveal about the inside of a house for a search to exist,
and distinguished Dow Chemical and Ciraolo using dicta that
qualified the holdings of those two cases where a surveillance
operation was found not to be a search.
98. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1814 n.3.
99. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 n.5, 121 S. Ct. at 2045 n.5.
100. Id., 121 S. Ct. at2045 n.5.
101. Id. at40, 121 S. Ct. at2046.
102. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
103. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227,238, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1827(1986) (emphasis added).
104. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3303 (1984).
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Finally, the phrase "not in general public use" was criticized by
the Kyllo dissent as introducing a whole new level of uncertainty.
The Court responded that the credit for the phrase belonged not
with Kyllo, but with Ciraolo. While that may be true, one thing is
striking about the incorporation of that phrase into the holding.
Given that the Constitution protects only against governmental
action, restrictions on private conduct must come from state
legislatures and Congress. If the Court restricts governmental use
only of enhanced surveillance technologies not in "general public
use," it would seem that privacy is continually eroded as the
general public has access to more sophisticated technologies.
When one's neighbor can perform a thermal scan of a house and
inform law enforcement of suspicious activity, probable cause to
issue a warrant may be shown without the government having
directly acted. 5
General public use is a function of cost, availability, and the
lack of statutory restrictions on possession. Given the cost trends
in consumer electronic devices, it can be expected that Radio
Shack® will one day sell such devices absent any government
restriction. In fact, the 2000 and later model Cadillac DeVille had
available as an option a Raytheon FLIR NightVision °6 system
fully the equal of the equipment used by the agents in 1991 to scan
Danny Kyllo's house.1 7 Might this fact be construed to mean that
thermal imaging technology is now "in general use by the public?"
If so, a fact pattern identical to Kyllo's occurring today might be
found not to be a search.
B. The Kyllo Dissent
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent in Kyllo, made much of
the fact that the thermal imager was not actually getting
information from the inside of the house, but rather reading with
some precision the temperature of the exterior walls and roof. This
reasoning completely ignores the fact that the directly analogous
condition existed in Katz. 8 There, a microphone outside of a
105. While it has always been true that private individuals are free to observe
their neighbors public activities, it is the recent availability of sophisticated
reconnaissance equipment that limits the individual's ability to readily retreat from
the public's eye.
106. See Raytheon, Products: NightVision, at http://www.raytheoninfiared.com
htn1/prod3a/summary.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
107. Respondent's Brief at n. 18, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,35, 121 S.
Ct. 2038, 2044 (No. 99-8508).
108. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44, 121 S. Ct. at 2048 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
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phone booth was not picking up the actual sound inside of the
phone booth, but the movements of the glass walls of the booth.
Today, even more advanced eavesdropping devices are
available, such as the "laser microphone"1 °9 that uses a laser beam
bounced off of a window to read the minute vibrations of the glass
induced by the sound waves inside a structure. The vibrations
create a modulating component of the reflected laser light that is
then converted to an electrical signal back at the laser microphone
transmitter/receiver located hundreds of yards away. The signal is
then amplified and played through a speaker, reproducing sound
that duplicates the sound waves inside the distant structure. As
with the thermal imager, the device is not directly reading or
monitoring anything "inside" the house, but measuring an exterior
-manifestation, the movement of a window pane.
The same phenomenon is what makes the thermal imaging
technique work as a surveillance tool. Several sources of energy
affect the temperature of the walls and roof of a house. Heat
sources inside the house cause the exterior surface temperature to
radiate unevenly, producing a pattern from which certain
information about what is inside the house may be inferred. Those
patterns of heat radiation on the outside are a manifestation of what
is happening inside the house in much the same way as the
vibrating glass outside the Katz phone booth reflect the sound
emanations on the inside. The dissent's contention that a search
does not occur when temperature is measured "off the wall""0 of
a house is, as Justice Harlan said in Katz, "bad physics as well as
bad law."'' .
The dissent also talked about the "waste heat" theory, drawing
an analogy to the intentional leaving of garbage at the curbside for
collection as in California v. Greenwood."' The dissipation of
heat is readily distinguished from the setting out of trash, however,
because a resident does so with full knowledge that any passerby,
be it the garbage man or a police officer, can readily open the bag
and snoop to their heart's delight. To "observe" heat energy
emanating from a building requires sophisticated equipment that
a trash picker probably does not have.
109. See Jarvis International Intelligence, Inc., Products: Laser Microphone, at
http://www.jarvisinternational.com/lasermic.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
110. The dissent in Kyllo used the term "offthe wall" to distinguish observation
of the exterior of the dwelling from observations of activity inside the dwelling("through-the-wall"). Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41, 121 S. Ct. at 2047.
111. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 362, 88 S. Ct. 507, 517 (1967).
(Harlan, J., concurring).
112. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
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IV. WHAT To Do? THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH
A. Possible Application of Existing Statutes
Title 18, Section 2510 of The United States Code provides
definitions of terms with specific meanings under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986. It defines "electronic
communications" as follows:
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds,
data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in
part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign
commerce. 
1 13
Reducing the text to terms pertinent to the Kyllo facts results in
"'electronic communication' means any transfer of images
transmitted by a[n] electromagnetic system that affects interstate or
foreign commerce." Infrared radiation is the form of energy that a
thermal imaging device senses. Like light and radio waves, it is an
electromagnetic form of radiation. 4 The infrared energy is emitted
or "transmitted" by any mass at a temperature above absolute
zero.'15 The source of the emission is inherently an electromagnetic
system in that it conveys information about itself in the form of
electromagnetic energy generated internally. So it could be said that
a wall of a house that is emitting an infrared image of itself produces
an "electronic communication" that cannot be legally intercepted
under Section 2511 (1)(a). An interesting aside is the exemption in
Section 2511(2)(g)(I) that allows interception of electronic
communications "made readily accessible to the general public.""
6
This language is surprisingly close to the Kyllo holding and might
readily yield similar results since both criteria allow interception of
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2000).
114. See Electromagnetic Radiation, 18 The New Encyclopedia Britannica 292,
293 (1989). Electromagnetic radiation is the propagation of energy through space
by means of electric and magnetic fields that vary in time. One property of
electromagnetic radiation is its wavelength. Familiar classifications of
electromagnetic radiation include radio and television signals, visible light and X-
rays, with the distinguishing characteristic between the classes being wavelength.
Infrared radiation falls between visible light and microwave radio signals in
wavelength.
115. See Absolute Zero, 1 The New Encyclopedia Britannica 40 (1989).
Absolute zero is the lowest temperature theoretically attainable, inferred from the
behavior of matter. At absolute zero, molecular motion essentially ceases.
116. 18U.S.C. § 2551 (2000).
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an image when the device used is made "accessible to the general
public." 7
While finding the use of thermal imaging to fit under the
provisions of the existing Title III statutes requires a stretch of
interpretation, consider the case of a device that is capable of
recording every keystroke of a computer keyboard or computer
display from outside of the building in which the computer is
located. The device is completely passive and detects the
modulated electromagnetic emissions from the keyboard or display.
Devices such as this exist and are the subject of a U.S. Government
National Security Agency (NSA) specification for computer
equipment that is immune to such monitoring." ' This form of
surveillance would likely be prohibited under the statutes, and the
physical science behind it is virtually identical to thermal imaging.
These obvious analogies between the physical science of thermal
imaging and other surveillance methods that are statutorily
prohibited could be argued, but would be susceptible to an
overbreadth defense. All human activity is susceptible to
observation in the form of energy reflection or emanation that is
readily captured and converted to "data." When those data are
pervasively captured, stored, and integrated with other data,
individual privacy becomes a physical impossibility.
B. Legislative Amendment to Title III
As the section above shows, the existing statutory provisions of
Title III of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act provide
some protections from both governmental and private
eavesdropping. However, the text is an adaptation of the original
legislation intended to limit wiretaps of telephone and telegraph era
technology. Since the nature, both materially and technically, of
the threat to privacy in the home is similar whether it involves
thermal imaging, keystroke monitoring, or other passive monitoring
technologies, redrafting the statutes should follow a single
generalized approach. Without such revisions, as noted above, the
Fourth Amendment protections against government overreaching
become moot once the general public has ready access to
sophisticated monitoring devices.
117. Note the similarity to the language from Kyllo that using a device "not ingeneral public use" to monitoractivity in a house would violate Fourth Amendment
protections.
118. Christopher J. Seline, Eavesdropping on the Compromising Emanations ofElectronic Equipment: The Law ofEnglandand the United States, 23 Case W. Res.J. Int'l L. 359 (1991) (referencing secret Tempest specification).
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A redrafting of the statutes should be based on a core objective
of providing information security that is not particular to any
existing technology. Rather than relying on nebulous metrics like
"reasonable expectations of privacy," the statutes should define
times, places, and modes of communications that are intended to be
secure. Then, a person will not have to guess whether a particular
channel of communications is secure; they will expect it to be secure
because of its protected status. Exceptions would create intentional
gaps allowing permissible uses, similar to the current exceptions
permitting reception of certain broadcast types of
communications.11 Possession of devices capable of unlawful use,
but also having lawful applications should be permitted with
penalties applying to any use that is prohibited." 0
By providing well defined protected contexts, the subjective
expectation of privacy will be the defining issue. If people expect
privacy, they will make the conscious effort to conform to the
context provided by the statute. The old "objective" component of
the Katz test will be provided by the Legislature, generally the
appropriate forum for that kind of determination.'
V. THE CONUNDRUM
The Fourth Amendment stands as a limitation against the
exercise of government power.' In no way does it restrict the
conduct of individuals acting in a private capacity. Restriction of
individual conduct is effected through legislative action that is, in
turn, subject to Constitutional limits. In the case of telephone and
electronic communications, the need to restrict both governmental
and individual interference has been recognized for most of the
twentieth century in the form of state and federal laws.' Use of
119. Examples are commercial radio and television, Ham radio and CB radio.
120. Many devices have legitimate uses and should not be outlawed. The
unlawful use is the activity that should be restricted and penalized. The Cadillac
NightVision system is one such example.
121. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474 (1998)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (pointing out that the Katz criteria that calls for the
expectation of privacy be one "that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable"
ends up bearing "an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this
Court considers reasonable"). This is Justice Scalia's inimitable way of saying that
legislatures tend to be the government body in the best position to make such
determinations.
122. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465,475,41 S. Ct. 574, 576(1921).
123. The Communications Act of 1934,47 U.S.C. § 605 (1991), extended the
protections against divulgence of information contained in the Radio Act of 1927.
While the Radio Act of 1927 was in force at the time of Olmstead, it did not protect
telephones.
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other electronic devices, such as the thermal imager in Kyllo, has not
been subject to the same kind of regulation and is becoming more
common as the cost of manufacture drops. It is logical to suggest
extension of existing state and federal statutory strictures to protect
individual privacy against government and private intrusion.
There is one problem with this solution. Any time the
government acts in the interest of protecting its citizens from some
form of individual conduct, that action necessarily interferes with
the freedoms of some part of the population. When that government
restriction implicates an interest subject to express constitutional
protection, the courts must resolve the conflict. Three weeks before
the Court decided Kyllo, it declared in Bartnicki v. Vopper 24 part of
the federal wiretap statute25 a violation of the First Amendment
insofar as it bars publication by the media 26 of illegally obtained
conversations. Bartnicki finds a questionable First Amendment
protection allowing disclosure "of lawfully obtained information of
public interest by one not involved in the initial illegality."', 27
While Bartnicki warrants a separate casenote, it is worthy of
mention in the context of Kyllo because it stands to completely
undermine any effort to statutorily protect individual privacy. If the
disclosure of truthful information of public interest, legally acquired,
despite its initial illegal acquisition, is constitutionally protected,
there can be no guarantee of privacy. The Court in Bartnicki found
the right of a radio station to play an illicitly obtained recording of
a private telephone conversation to be protected under the First
Amendment, and that criminal penalties for such actions provided
under federal wiretap laws were unconstitutional. 28 As a result of
Bartnicki, new technologically advanced devices will inevitably be
used to provide interesting content for the tabloid publications found
at the grocery checkout line. Judging from the existing materials on
the front pages of those publications, there are a wide range of
things, truthful or otherwise, that are "of public interest." If a
person's best efforts to keep information secret are trumped by the
interest of others to disclose that information, legislatively provided
protections of privacy can eventually be defeated by technology.
124. 532 U.S. 514, 121 S. Ct. 1753 (2001).
125. Specifically, Section 2511(1)(c) prohibits "any person intentionallydisclos[ing] ... the contents of any ... electronic communication, knowing orhaving reason to know that the information was obtained... in violation of this
subsection." 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(c)) (2000).126. The "medi[um]" in Bartnicki was a radio station that broadcast an illegally
taped intercept of a cellphone conversation and newspapers that published
transcripts thereof.
127. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529, 121 S. Ct. at 1762.
128. Id. at 534, 121 S. Ct. at 1765.
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It must be recognized, that while the First Amendment assures
the right to speak, "[t]here is necessarily, and within suitably defined
areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which
serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative
aspect."' 2  The Court has previously found the right to not speak
contained in the First Amendment, holding that a public school
cannot compel students to recite the pledge of allegiance, 3 ° and that
New Hampshire drivers cannot be forced to adorn their vehicles with
the slogan "live free or die" on their license plates.' 3' Thus, it is
clear that the right to "not speak" is protected by the First
Amendment under certain circumstances. That raises an interesting
question at to whether that First Amendment right is superior to the
First Amendment right of another to disclose that information to the
public. Bartnicki, applying a standard of strict scrutiny in favor of
disclosure, did not appear to give appropriate weight to the chilling
effect that the spectre of potential disclosure must inevitably have on
individual free speech. Hopefully, Bartnicki will not be expanded
beyond the narrow scope of its facts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kyllo did not expand or contract the Fourth Amendment
protections as interpreted in Katz, but the decision did clarify how
the rule of Katz is applied to activities occurring inside a home. The
Court noted that the specific reference to houses in the text of the
Fourth Amendment means that expectations of privacy in a home are
de facto objectively reasonable, as long as the general public does
not possess the ability to defeat the privacy shield of the home.
The language stating that an expectation of privacy in the home
would cease to be objectively reasonable when members of the
general public have access to sophisticated surveillance equipment
sets the limit to which the Fourth Amendment can effectively protect
privacy. Protection from government searches is a less valuable
right when the "general public" can do the same thing with
impunity. The only way to sustain an expectation of privacy in the
home is to pass legislation that limits the use of sophisticated
surveillance technologies by the public. Finally, existing statutory
protections must be revised to encompass technological
129. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559, 105
S. Ct. 2218,2230 (1985) (quoting New York Chief Judge Fuld's opinion in Estate
of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d. 250 (N.Y. 1968)).
130. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178
(1943).
131. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977).
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enhancement of all senses, notjust "listening." The Constitution can
only go so far in protecting privacy, and legislation is the
appropriate mechanism to balance the conflicting public interests in
a democratic republic.
Stephen A. LaFleur"
* I would like to thank Professor John S. Baker, Jr. for his advice and
guidance in developing this note, as well as Professor Paul R. Baier and Professor
James W. Bowers, our scholarly writing seminar instructors. These professors have
taught me to look beyond the casebook to find the law. I also want to thank my
wife, Dr. Dianne LaFleur and our six children for giving me the opportunity to
pursue a second career in the law. Finally, I must mention Mrs. Bertha Messer who
has helped Dianne to look after the children while I spend the long hours that law
school demands.
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